In a framework in which a strictly risk-averse manager jointly determines a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards, it is investigated how optimal declarations of book profits and the tax base are determined. The impact of (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) parameters of the tax system on the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits is analysed.
Introduction
The analysis of tax evasion by firms has almost entirely neglected the relationship between tax payments and financial accounting. However, there are obvious trade-offs: a highly profitable company according to financial accounting standards is less likely to be able to claim a small tax base than a less profitable firm. This is the case because tax authorities can use financial accounting statements, book profit declarations for short, as an (imperfect) indicator for taxes due. Thus low book profits can help to hide tax evasion activities. But high profits according to financial accounting standards can also be attractive. The greater book profits are, the higher can, for example, be the share-based remuneration of managers. Hence high tax payments -or even overreporting of tax liabilities -can help to support excessive book profit declarations.
The joint choice of book and tax profit declarations in a world in which tax evasion or tax overpayments can result as equilibrium outcomes is investigated below. Related literature is surveyed in Section 2, while the model is set up in Section 3. It is assumed that the company under consideration is run by a strictly risk-averse manager whose (indirect) utility is defined over income, which is an increasing function of net profits. It is shown that a number of equilibria can arise. If the tax rate is sufficiently low, the gain from excessive tax payments in term of higher book profit declarations surpasses the cost of more taxes due, such that tax overpayments will occur. If the fine for tax evasion is sufficiently high, tax declarations will be truthful and the manager can raise personal income solely by making excessive book profit declarations. Finally, tax evasion can take place. In Section 4, the impact of various parameters on optimal profit declarations is investigated. In particular, if tax overpayments occur, less outside control of the manager's actions, greater cost of divergent book-tax declarations, lower cost of excessive profit declarations (relative to true profits), and a lower tax rate will raise book profits and reduce tax honesty, while an increase in the manager's fixed salary will reduce tax honesty and will not affect book profits. If tax evasion occurs in equilibrium, comparative static effects will generally depend on the manager's attitude towards risk. Section 5 summarises and concludes. Formal derivations are relegated to an appendix.
Literature
Many analyses of tax evasion behaviour by firms focus on the question whether the tax evasion decision can be separated from output choices. The study by Rice (1992) is apparently the only investigation of firms' tax declarations -for a given tax enforcement system -which allows for 1 See, inter alia, Wang and Conant (1988) , Wang (1990) , Yaniv (1995 Yaniv ( , 1996 , Marelli (1984) , Marelli and Martina (1988) , Lee (1998) , and Panteghini (2000) . insufficient or excessive declarations within the same setting.
2 Rice (1992) assumes, first, that being audited involves fixed costs for a firm and, second, that the probability of an audit declines with reported taxable income. If fixed costs of an audit are not too high (sufficiently large), underreporting (overreporting) of income will raise expected profits because the reduction in expected tax payments more than compensates (does not offset) the increase in expected audit costs. At first sight, the lack of analyses on tax overpayments seems intuitive since excessive tax payments involve costs but entail no gains. However, there is evidence to the contrary. Erickson et al. (2004) find that in a sample of 27 firms accused by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission of accounting fraud, 16 firms paid taxes on overstated earnings "at a mean rate of 19 cents per dollar of pretax earnings overstatement" (p. 5). Furthermore, more than two-thirds of all corporations in a sample of United States (TCMP) data underreported taxable income, while around 6% actually overreported (Rice 1992) .
Another strand of literature focuses on the role of managers for tax evasion by firms. Chen and Chu's (2005) , for example, investigate the incentives for a risk-averse manager to provide (unobservable) effort in a principal-agent setting if the firm's risk-neutral owner can decide to evade taxes but thereby introduces an income risk for the manager. Desai et al. (2003) also investigate the impact of tax evasion opportunities on the divergence of interests between managers and outside shareholders. Their basic point is that income generated by evasion activities is easier to hide from outside owners and, hence, more likely to be appropriated by inside managers. Related, Desai and Dharmapala (2004) presume that a risk-neutral manager can evade taxes and divert earnings within the firm in order to increase his personal income. One of their main theoretical findings is that the relationship between incentive pay and tax evasion activities depends on the specification of a reduced-form loss function which depicts the cost of tax evasion and income diversion. This ambiguity is also reflected in their empirical findings.
In addition, there is a substantial -mainly -accounting literature on the incentives for firms to report financial data to the public which do not conform to the information used for making tax declarations. 4 However, the investigation of book-tax reporting differences is rarely combined with the issue of false tax declarations. As an exception, Mills and Sansing (2000) construct a 2 Boadway and Sato (2000) look at a world with two levels of income in which type I or type II errors can occur in the assessment of taxable income. They show that an optimal enforcement system may involve rewards for honest tax payers such that overreporting of income by low income individuals can represent equilibrium behaviour (Proposition 3, case ii) 3 Also in a principal-agent framework in which a manager decides about corporate tax evasion, Crocker and Slemrod (2004) show that evasion can be deterred more effectively by fines imposed on the manager since the impact of a penalty on shareholders is only imperfectly transmitted via the optimal compensation contract. 4 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a survey. Desai (2003) finds that "the link between book and tax income has broken down over the last decade" (p. 171) in the United States and indicates that "the distinctive way in which the relationship … has deteriorated … is consistent with increased levels of tax sheltering." (p. 200). Manzon and Plesko (2002) contain further evidence.
simple game-theoretic model in which the government maximises tax revenues less audit costs, while the firm minimises tax payments less audit costs. In equilibrium, the optimal audit probability rises with the book-tax difference in expenses. Mills and Sansing (2000) examine United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data for 1982-92 and find support for their prediction. Mills (1996) , also using IRS data, moreover shows that the difference between tax payments required by the IRS and those made by a firm, rises with the divergence of book and tax accounting. Hence, costs of making divergent book-tax declarations seem to increase with the magnitude of differential statements.
Summing up it can be concluded: (1) The joint decision about book and (incorrect) tax statements has not found much attention. 
Model

Framework
Consider a strictly risk-averse, male manager of a firm, characterised by Von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and the (indirect) utility function u, u' > 0, u'' < 0, whose remuneration consists of a fixed salary I and a variable, incentive-based component. While a fixed salary, in general, represents less than 50% of a CEO's pay in the United States, in other countries the respective share may be much higher (Murphy 1999 (Murphy , p. 2495 . The variable component of a manager's remuneration typically includes bonuses or options. The payment of bonuses is often conditional on fulfilling performance measures, such as a profit indicator. Accordingly, it is assumed that the basis for the incentive-based part of the manager's income are the firm's true profits N, given exogenously, and book profits B, i.e. the level of profits announced to the public according to financial accounting standards. The respective weights are given by O and (1 -O). The parameter O may, thus, reflect opportunities of the firm's owners to control the manager's influence on his income and is, subsequently, referred to as a measure of outside control.
Moreover, the profit-related part of remuneration declines with tax payments Tt, where t is the tax rate and T the amount of profits declared to tax authorities. T may differ from the true level of profits N, which also defines tax obligations, because taxes can be evaded or overpaid. Tax evasion, if detected, entails a penalty, while overpayments which are observed by tax authorities are not repaid since managers have no incentive to reclaim them. Given a weight a P 0 attached to the profit component, labelled the profit dependency of manager's income, overall income in the case of either not evading taxes or of not being found out doing so, amounts to y e := I + a(ON + (1 -O)B -Tt). Evasion, characterised by T < N, will be detected with probability 1 -p. In this case, the manager has to pay a fine Ft S (N -T), being a linear function of evaded taxes (S = 1) or undeclared profits (S = 0), and his income amounts to y c := y e -Ft S (N -T).
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Alternatively, it may be argued that executive compensation is determined by pre-tax profits.
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In the present setting, if executive compensation depended on pre-tax profits there is no incentive to evade taxes, while tax overpayments can arise. Assuming the manager's income to be an increasing function of post-tax profits, therefore, provides for a more general analytical framework than using pre-tax profits as determinant of earnings.
Tax authorities may be more likely to audit a firm and to impose cost on the manager if book profit declarations B exceed the amount announced to tax authorities T. Alternatively, claiming book profits to be greater than taxable profits may alert the firm's owners to excessive profit declarations by the manager. Accordingly, it is assumed that the manager's expected utility declines with the difference between book profits B and tax profits T. This relationship is consistent with evidence provided by Mills (1996) and Mills and Sansing (2000) and is assumed to apply, irrespective of whether tax profits T exceed or fall short of true profits N. For simplicity, a linear impact is assumed, where the parameter T measures the strength of this effect.
Hence, expected utility declines by T(B -T) for B -T > 0, while T = 0 holds for B -T U 0. This restriction captures the idea that a tax profit declaration which equals or exceeds book profit statements will not cause any direct utility loss to the manager.
Excessive book profit declarations may also be costly for the manager from another point of view, which may be labelled the capital market perspective. Suppose, the manager is found out to have inflated book profits in order to boost his own earnings. Such an action may reduce his future reputation or impair the opportunities to act on behalf of the firm, such that profits decline.
Alternatively, claiming excessive profits may induce the firms' owners to dismiss the manager or it can deteriorate future job opportunities. Hence, it is presumed that book profit declarations in excess of true profits reduce expected utility according to a strictly convex, continuous function V = V(B -N), implying V, V', V'' > (=) 0 for B -N > (U) 0, where the convexity assumption ensures an interior solution also in a situation with tax overpayments.
5 Subsequent results are not materially affected by the assumption that a tax or penalty payment of one unit reduces a manager's profit-related income basis by the same amount, as long as a reduced sensitivity to tax payments goes hand in hand with a proportionally lower impact of profits on the manager's income. Moreover, the above specification implies that a tax overpayment does not entail a penalty for a false tax declaration. 6 See Murphy (1999 Murphy ( , p. 2501 and Phillips (2003) who reports for a sample of United States firms that about 60% (32%) of CEOs (business-unit managers) have contracts which relate income to after-tax performance measures.
Denoting the manager's expected utility by V, his objective for B > N > T can be expressed as:
If B > T > N, the objective collapses to ( )
Optimal Choices
The manager chooses profits T announced to tax authorities and book profit declarations B.
Optimal tax and book profit declarations may differ and, furthermore, exceed, fall short of or equal true profits N. The ensuing multiplicity of relative profit levels and potential equilibrium Assuming an interior solution with tax evasion (T < N) and book profit declarations in excess of true profits (B > N), optimal levels of book and tax profit statements are defined by:
where y e : = I + a(ON + (1 -O)B -Tt) and y c : = I + a(ON + (1 -O)B -Tt -Ft S (N -T) have been defined above. Relative to a pure tax evasion framework, there is an additional gain from paying taxes in the present setting, as higher tax profits reduce costs of excessive book profits T(B -T).
Comparative Statics
How are optimal book and tax profit declarations affected by changes in the measure a of the profit dependency of the manager's income, the indicator of outside control O, the fixed salary I, marginal costs T of making divergent book-tax declarations, marginal costs V' of excessive profit declarations relative to true profits, and the tax rate t? Since Case 5 strongly resembles a traditional tax evasion problem à la Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) , its analysis will be kept brief.
Case 1: Truthful Tax Declarations And Excessive Book Profits
Optimal behaviour will be governed solely by the first-order condition (2) with respect to the optimal choice of book profits B, for y e = y c = I + a((O -t)N + (1 -O)B) if, first, the gains from tax evasion are unambiguously negative, for example, due to a sufficiently high fine F and, second, an overpayment of taxes is too costly. In such a setting, one obtains:
If profits are declared truthfully to tax authorities and book profits exceed true profits, book profits B will rise with the tax rate t, and also with the profit dependency a of the manager's income if relative risk-aversion ) y ( is less than the ratio of total income y to profit-related income aX, i.e. if ) y ( < y/(aX) > 1. Moreover, book profits B decline with the marginal costs T of making divergent book-tax declarations, the marginal costs V' of excessive profit declarations (relative to true profits), the salary I, and will also fall with the measure of outside control O if ) y ( < y/(a(X -(N -Tt)) > y/(aX) > 1.
Proof: see Appendix 1 Remarks (V', T) If marginal costs of excessive book profits relative either to true profits (V') or taxable profits (T) rise, a manager will reduce the optimal amount of book profit declarations since the utility gain from making excessive book profit declarations shrinks.
(I, t) An increase (a decrease) in the manager's salary I (tax rate t) reduces his marginal utility of income due to the strict concavity of the utility function u. Therefore, the gain from making excessive book profit declarations, declines and optimal book profit declarations fall.
(a, O) A greater weight a of profits in the manager's remuneration, on the one hand, raises marginal utility, such that the incentives to make excessive book profit declarations increase. On the other hand, the manager's income rises, and marginal utility of income declines. This tends to lower book profit statements. If (relative) risk-aversion is not too great, the latter impact will be dominated by the former, and optimal book profit declarations rise. The greater the share of the fixed salary I in the manager's total remuneration is, that is the larger the difference between y and a\, the greater relative risk-aversion can be, for a positive relationship between the weight a of profits in the manager's remuneration and book profit statements to exist. This is the case because the increase in income due to a greater weight a of profits and the ensuing decline in marginal utility will be small if most of the manager's income is independent of profits. Accordingly, the impact of risk-aversion does not play a great role, relative to the direct income effect. Basically, the reverse intuition as for the impact of a greater weight of profits applies to the relationship between the measure of outside control O and B. A greater extent of control directly reduces the gain from making excessive book profit statements. However, since income falls, marginal utility rises and risk-aversion considerations become less important.
Taking a value of 50% as an approximation of the profit-related component in the manager's remuneration (Murphy 1999 (Murphy , pp. 2495 , the ratio y/a\ equals 2. While Arrow (1971, pp. 97 f) , based on theoretical considerations, indicates a plausible value of relative risk-aversion around unity, empirically the consensus seems to be that the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative riskaversion exceeds unity. Recent empirical work suggests that the respective coefficient may even be substantially greater than unity and easily exceed a value of two. Suppose next that the manager optimally chooses a level of taxable profits which exceeds the true level but does not surpass book profits (B P T > N). In such a regime, utility will not vary because no fines are imposed. Since it is never optimal for book profit declarations to fall short of tax profits, the equilibrium is defined by a combination of equations (2) and (3) If tax payments are excessive and taxable profits do not exceed book profits, book profits B are unaffected by variations in the salary I and the profit dependency of the manager's income a, and rise with marginal costs T of making divergent book-tax profit declarations for T < B. Tax profit declarations T increase with marginal costs T of making divergent book-tax profit declarations for T < B and the fixed salary I, and change in ambiguous manner with the profit dependency of income a. An increase in marginal costs V' of excessive book profit declarations (relative to true profits), the measure of outside control O, and the tax rate t lower book and tax profit statements.
Proof: see Appendix 2 Remarks (a) An increase in the measure a of profit dependency has two effects: first, it raises the marginal gain u'(y)a of higher book and tax profit declarations and, thus, implies the need for higher income. Second, income rises and marginal utility of income decreases. The overall impact on optimal book or tax profit declarations, for a given value of the other endogenous variable, depends on the magnitude of relative risk-aversion. 8 However, any change in income y, in response to the increase in a, affects the manager's choice of book and tax profits equally, with the exception of a constant factor. Since the marginal costs of excessive book profit statements are given by V'(B -N) and change with the difference between book and true profits (as V'' > 0), and because true profits are fixed, book profits must remain the same for the first-order condition (2) to hold. Thus, the entire adjustment in income in response to an increase in the measure of profit dependency a is due to the variation in tax profits T. The higher relative risk-aversion is, the greater the decline in marginal utility due to a rise in income. For the direct positive impact of a greater profit dependency to dominate the risk effect, relative risk-aversion must be bounded from above by 1 plus the ratio I/(a\) of fixed to profit-related income. In such a situation, it is optimal for the manager to react to the increase in the profit dependency of income by a decrease in tax profits. The higher the fraction of the salary I in the manager's total remuneration is, that is the lower the parameter a for a given income y, the more likely it is, that tax profits decline. This is the case because the rise in profit-related income, which reduces the manager's utility from income, is the smaller, the lower the measure of the profit dependency of income.
(O) If remuneration depended on true profits N only (O = 1), optimal book profit declarations equalled tax and true profits. Since B > N, a stronger impact of true profits on the manager's income unambiguously lowers book profit statements for O < 1. However, if book profit declarations decline, the necessity to overpay taxes, in order to reduce the costs of excessive book profits, will also shrink. Accordingly, tax profit declarations are lowered. From the firstorder condition for the optimal choice of tax profits it can be noted that book and tax profits have to be adjusted in such a manner as to leave overall income y unaffected. This implies dy/dO = a[N -B + (1 -O)(^B/^O) -t(^T/^O)] = 0. Since N < B, 1 -O > t, and ^B/^O, ^T/^O < 0 hold, tax profit declarations fall by more than book profit statements. This is beneficial for the manager since the income gain more than compensates the decrease in expected utility due to higher costs of divergent book-tax declarations. The difference between book and true profits obviously declines.
As indicated in Section 3, the parameter O can be interpreted as a measure of control of the manager by the firm's owners. The above results suggest that firms with a widely dispersed ownership, or organised in a way which grants owners little insight into financial affairs, and hence characterised by a low value of O, exhibit greater divergences between profit declarations and true profits than firms which are controlled more tightly in a setting characterised by tax overpayments.
(T) An increase in marginal costs T of making divergent book-tax profit declarations provides an incentive to bring book profits B and tax profits T more into line. At first sight it appears as if this can best be done by lowering book and raising tax profits. However, such a response lowers the manager's income. To mitigate the fall in income, the manager does not reduce but actually raises book profit declarations B. Since excessive book profits entail marginal costs irrespective of tax profit declarations, if book profits exceed true profits, the increase in book profit declarations will be less than the rise in tax profits. Income y and expected utility V decline.
The responses to a change in marginal cost T have the interesting implication that a more pronounced sanction for making divergent book-tax profit declarations increases the extent of untruthful reporting of both measures of profits, since the difference between, on the one hand, book and true profits and, on the other hand, tax and true profits unambiguously goes up. If, therefore, tax authorities use information on book-tax differences to determine the probabilityand perhaps intensity -of a tax audit, and if the use of this information is intensified, the rational response for managers to this change in policy may be to raise the positive difference between profit declarations and true profits. An alternative interpretation of the finding is that economies in which the link between financial accounting standards and tax laws is weak, but shall be strengthened -such that a given the amount of (positive) divergence between book and tax profits becomes more costly -will experience a greater extent of excessive profit statements.
(V') Since marginal costs V' of excessive book profit declarations do not affect optimal tax profits, income y does not change with V'. An increase in V', for given values of book and true profits, however, reduces the marginal expected utility of excessive book profit declarations B. Therefore, the difference between book profits B and true profits N has to decline for marginal (I) From the first-order condition for the optimal choice of tax profits T, it can be noted that an increase in the salary I must be compensated by an adjustment in either book or tax profit declarations to such an extent that the manager's overall income y remains unaffected. This is because marginal costs T of excessive tax profits are fixed (cf. equation (3)). Hence, the gain must also be constant. From the first-order condition (2) for the optimal choice of book profits B it is apparent that a constant income y will only be compatible with an optimal selection of B if book profits and marginal costs V'(B -N) of excessive book profit declarations are unaffected. Accordingly, excessive tax profit declarations T have to go up. This is the optimal response to a higher salary I since a decline in book profit declarations by one unit reduces income by 1 -O units, while greater tax profits lower income by t < 1 -O units. The manager's expected utility rises as the book-tax difference B -T and, hence, costs of making divergent declarations decline.
(t) A higher tax rate t raises the costs of excessive tax payments without affecting their gain.
Hence, excessive tax profit declarations are reduced. Such a response increases the manager's income for a given amount of book profit declarations, since tax payments decline. Thus, marginal (expected) utility from income falls. To bring into line the gain from excessive book profit declarations with the resulting costs, book profit declarations have to be reduced. Book profits fall by less than tax profits. Although income rises, expected utility V will decline. 10 9 Tax payments Tt change with the tax rate t since also declared tax profits T vary. The overall effect is given by d(Tt)/dt = tau'(y)(a 2 (1 -O) 2 u''(y) -V'')/D < 0, where use has been made of equation (A.2.12) in Appendix A.2. 10 To obtain these results, use has been made of equations (A.2.9) and (A.2.13) in Appendix A.2 and of t 2 < (1 -O) 2 to calculate the sign of dB/dt -dT/dt. Given the negative relationship between the tax rate and excessive profit declarations, the above finding suggests, that excessive book and tax profit declarations are pronounced in low tax countries, controlling for all other determinants of inaccurate profit statements. This conjecture is further strengthened by the upper limit on the tax rate which the existence of Case 2 requires.
Case 3: Taxes Are Evaded While Book Profits Are Excessive
Suppose next that taxes are evaded while book profits exceed the true level (B > N > T). In contrast to Cases 1 and 2, income may vary according to whether tax evasion is detected or not.
Optimal behaviour is determined by the first-order conditions (2) and (3) for y e > y c . Formally, the manager's maximisation problem is similar to that of a tax evading individual which also determines hours of work optimally. Accordingly, few analytical results, summarised in Proposition 3, can be derived.
Proposition 3 (Case 3, B > N > T)
Suppose, taxes are evaded while book profits exceed the true level (B > N > T). In such a setting, optimal book profit declarations decline with the fixed salary I and marginal costs V' of excessive book profit declarations (relative to true profits), and will fall (rise) with marginal costs T of making divergent book-tax profit declarations (the tax rate t) if V TB U 0, that is if absolute riskaversion is decreasing strongly with income. If V TB U 0 holds, moreover, higher marginal costs T of divergent book-tax profit declarations, a lower salary I and a greater measure of outside control O will decrease tax evasion. If V TB > 0, tax evasion will decline with the marginal costs V' of excessive book profit declarations, will rise with the measure of outside control O, the salary I and, in addition, the tax rate if the penalty is levied on undeclared income (S = 0). Only if F P 2t (1 -S) holds, tax evasion will unambiguously decline with the penalty F.
Proof: see Appendix 3 11 Remarks (V') Higher marginal costs V' of excessive book profit declarations (relative to true profits) reduce incentives to make excessive book profit statements. The decline in B, however, lowers income.
If absolute risk-aversion is rising with income, the fall in income will make the manager more willing to risk income variability resulting from evasion. Tax profit declarations decline and tax 11 The relationship between the other exogenous variables and book and tax profit declarations is ambiguous. Therefore, the relevant formal derivations (dt/da, dB/da, dB/dO, dB/dF) are omitted in Appendix 3. evasion rises. The same reaction will occur if absolute risk-aversion is weakly decreasing with income, due to the costs of making divergent tax-book declarations.
(I) A higher salary I reduces marginal (expected) utility from income, irrespective of whether tax evasion is detected or not. For a given level of tax profits, the gains from excessive book profit statements fall short of its costs. Accordingly, the manager uses the income gain to align book and true profits more closely and to lower declared book profits B. Gains and losses from tax evasion are unaffected, for a given level of income. Therefore, an adjustment in tax profit declarations is conditional on a change in income. From the first-order condition for the optimal choice of book profits (2) it can be noted that a rise in the salary I is not compatible with a fall in book profit declarations B of such an extent that overall income remains unaffected, since marginal costs V' of excessive book profit statements also decline. Accordingly, marginal (expected) utility from income must decline, that is book profits have to fall by less than the amount which would leave income unaffected. 12 An increase in income will induce a manager who is characterised by weakly declining absolute risk-version to reduce tax evasion. However, if absolute risk-aversion is strongly declining with income, optimal tax profit statements will fall.
(T) Greater marginal costs T of making divergent book-tax declarations lower the gain from excessive book and insufficient tax profit statements. Ceteris paribus, book profit declarations and tax evasion decline. However, this potential decline in book profit statements and in the amount of taxes evaded reduces income. For the initial impact to unambiguously dominate the ensuing risk effect, such that tax evasion (N -T) and excessive book profit statements B decline, absolute risk-aversion has to strongly decline with income.
(O) Greater outside control O of the manager's behaviour will lower (raise) tax evasion if absolute risk-aversion is (not) decreasing strongly with income. The intuition is similar to the one which applies for fixed income I. While an increase in the salary raises the manager's income, stronger outside control O has the opposite impact, given that book profits exceed the true level.
Moreover, incentives to make excessive book profit declarations are reduced, for a given income, because income and (expected) utility will rise by less with book profits if their relative weight declines. Both effects will imply a reduction in income to which the manager will react by raising tax evasion if absolute risk-aversion is not decreasing too much. The change in optimal book profit declarations B is ambiguous, since the fall in income raises the incentives to make excessive book declarations while the smaller impact of book profits on income reduces these incentives.
(F) A negative relationship between a monetary fine and the extent of evasion is a cornerstone of most tax evasion models. In the present setting, the linkage need not be negative for two reasons: first, tax evasion will be costly to the manager even in the absence of a penalty if book profit declarations exceed tax profits. Second, a higher penalty reduces expected income. If the penalty is sufficiently high, in that it exceeds t (1 -S) , tax profit declarations will unambiguously rise with the fine, for a given amount of book profits. However, the manager responds to a higher penalty by lowering book profit declarations, for a given amount of tax evasion.
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The impact of the reduction in book profits on tax evasion behaviour depends on the extent of the manager's riskaversion. If the penalty F is not less than 2t (1 -S) , the direct (negative) impact of a higher penalty on the optimal amount of tax profits will unambiguously dominate any repercussion via the book profit effect and tax evasion will decline. 14 (t) Assuming book profits to be fixed and not to affect costs of evasion (T = 0), it can be noted from the first-order condition (3) and equation (A.3.7) in the Appendix, that tax evasion will decline with the tax rate if the penalty depends on evaded income (S = 1) and absolute riskaversion decreases with income. This is the same result as in a pure tax evasion framework (Yitzhaki 1974 ) and arises because no substitution effect exists.
However, in the present framework the substitution effect unambiguously raises tax evasion because of the existence of additional gains from higher tax payments T, as inspection of the first-order condition (3) reveals. Moreover, for a given tax profit declaration, income declines with the tax rate. This decrease in income will raise tax evasion, if absolute risk-aversion is not decreasing too strongly with income. Finally, an increase in the tax rate raises the penalty payment for S = 1 and will have no penalty impact if S = 0. Therefore, a higher tax rate will only unambiguously raise tax evasion if absolute risk-aversion is not decreasing too strongly with income and if the penalty depends on undeclared profits. Moreover, for a given tax profit declaration, higher tax rates reduce income such that optimal book profit statements are raised.
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Apart from this direct positive impact there is an indirect impact which can work in the opposite direction. This indirect effect occurs due to the substitution effect of a higher tax rate which drives up tax evasion and raises income. If absolute risk-aversion is rising -or weakly decreasing -with income, managers will attempt to counteract this development by decreasing income and book profit statement. Thus, book profits B will rise with the tax rate t unambiguously only if absolute risk-aversion is decreasing strongly with income. 13 See equations (A.3.1), (A.3.2), and (A.3.8) and (A.3.13) in Appendix 3 for these results. 14 Note that the restriction F > 2t 1-S is compatible with the maximal value for the fine for tax evasion to occur, namely F < (t 1-S -T/(au'(y)t S ))/(1 -p) if p is sufficiently greater than 0.5. 15 See equations (A.3.1) and (A.3.12) in Appendix 3.
Case 4: Taxes Are Evaded And Book Profits Do Not Exceed The True Level
In a situation, in which taxes are evaded while book profits do not exceed the true level but tax profit statements (N P B > T), increasing declared book profits entails no decline in the manager's expected utility at the margin but raises the probability of being detected evading taxes. Accordingly, the first-order conditions for the optimal choice of book and tax profits are given by equations (2) Suppose, taxes are evaded while book profits do not exceed the true level but surpass tax profit statements (N P B > T). In such a setting, tax evasion will fall with the profit dependency a if absolute risk-aversion is not decreasing with income. Moreover, tax evasion does not change with the salary I, and will rise with the tax rate t if the penalty is a function of undeclared income (S = 0). The impact of the other exogenous variables on tax evasion and book profit statements is the same as in Case 3.
Proof: See Appendix 3 below and assume V'' = 0. Remarks (I) Profits declared to tax authorities and, hence, tax evasion will not change with the manager's salary I, in contrast to the case of excessive book profits, because the complete adjustment in income, which is required to neutralise the impact of a rise in I, is achieved via a fall in book profit declarations.
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This is the case, since variations in book profits have the same impact on both first-order conditions (2) and (3).
(a) A higher measure of profit dependency a has a substitution and an income effect. The substitution effect raises tax evasion, for a given amount of book profits, and book profits for a given extent of evasion. The income effects cause adjustments in opposite directions.
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The calculations show that income declines such that constant or increasing absolute risk-aversion ensures that tax evasion falls.
(t) Basically, the impact of a higher tax rate t on tax evasion will be ambiguous because of the counteracting impact of a higher penalty -if it depends on the amount of evaded taxes -and the substitution impact due to the increase in book profit statements. However, an optimal choice of book profit declarations for B < N, implying V' = 0, entails that marginal expected utility -the 16 See equations (A.3.19) for V' ' = 0 and (A.3.20) in Appendix 3. 17 See equations (A.3.5) and (A.3.9) in Appendix 3.
term in square brackets in the first-order condition (2) -is a constant. A constant marginal expected utility and the absence of a first-order tax effect in the condition for the optimal choice of book profit statements is tantamount to the absence of an income effect. Therefore, tax evasion will rise if the substitution impact of higher book profits dominates the effect of an increase in the effective penalty. This will unambiguously be the case if the penalty is independent of the tax rate and S = 0.
Case 5: Taxes Are Evaded While Book Profits Equal Tax Profit Statements
The first-order condition for a setting in which tax profit declarations equal book profit statements but both fall short of true profits (N > B = T) is given by equation (3) for B = T. This is the case since T = 0 and V' = 0 (due to B < N) imply V B > 0. However, book profits B are not raised beyond T because this would entail marginal costs T, which are too high to represent an optimal choice, by assumption. Hence, only an interior solution for tax profit declarations T can be achieved. This requires 1 -O -t < 0, as already discussed in Section 3.2. Basically, Case 5 resembles a pure tax evasion setting. The difference being that in the present set-up, first, managers are paid an untaxed salary I and, second, any change in tax payments translates into a variation of the manager's income of the opposite direction via the adjustment in book profits which equal tax profit declarations. Thus, the intuition for results summarised in Proposition 5 is similar -or the same -as in the standard tax evasion model and will not be dwelt upon further.
Proposition 5 (Case 5, N > B = T)
Suppose, tax profit declarations equal book profit statements but both fall short of true profits (N > B = T). In such a setting, tax evasion will rise (fall) with the salary I if managers exhibit decreasing (increasing) absolute risk-aversion. Moreover, non-increasing absolute risk-aversion ensures that tax evasion rises with a greater measure of outside control O and non-decreasing absolute risk-aversion guarantees that tax evasion declines with the measure of profit dependency a and true profits N. A higher tax rate t will raise tax evasion if managers exhibit non-decreasing absolute risk-aversion and the penalty is independent of the tax rate (S = 0).
Proof: Results obtain from equation (3) for T = B and T = 0 and are available upon request.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper the joint decision about tax declarations and book profit statements by a risk-averse manager is analysed. Tax payments reduce the manager's payoff, ceteris paribus, while excessive book profits are assumed to increase it. However, tax evasion may be penalised and excessive book profit declarations can also be costly. In this framework, book profits never fall short of true profits and tax profit declarations simultaneously since such a choice would allow for an increase of the manager's utility at no costs. Moreover, taxes may be overpaid if costs of excessive book profit statements decline sufficiently. Tax evasion can also occur in equilibrium.
Which of the equilibria arises does not vary in a systematic manner with the components of managers' remuneration. Instead, the prevalent regime strongly depends on the nature of the tax (enforcement) system and, partly, on its interaction with the possibility to control the manager's actions from outside the firm.
It is investigated how the optimal amount of book and tax profit declarations varies with the composition of the manager's remuneration, costs of making untruthful book profit declarations, and the parameters of the tax system. The effects are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 assuming the manager to exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. Table 1 excludes Case 5 as this setting presumes that book profit statements B cannot vary independently. The table shows that only variations in the salary I and marginal costs V' of excessive book profit declarations (relative to true profits) have an unambiguous impact on optimal book profit statements. An increase in the manager's salary I never increases the excess of book profits over true profits. The findings suggest that in countries or companies in which managers are primarily compensated with a fixed salary, the difference between publicly declared book profits and the true level is smaller than in settings in which the CEO's compensation is more strongly dependent on profit-related, variable elements.
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If V' is interpreted as an indicator of the effectiveness with which the capital market can verify information, the excessive book statements will be less pronounced in economies in which the capital market can corroborate this information effectively. 
Turning to tax profit declarations, Table 2 sums up the impact of variations in exogenous variables on the extent of tax mis-declarations, that is in Case 2 on the positive difference between tax profits T and true profits N and in Cases 3 to 5 on the negative difference between T and N.
Case 1 is excluded from Table 2 as it considers a situation with truthful tax profit declarations. 
n.a. -comparative static result is not available since restriction for relevant case to apply implies a fixed value for the variable.
While the overwhelming consensus in the tax evasion literature seems to be that absolute riskaversion is not increasing with income (see, for example, Ballassone and Jones 1998 for a discussion), this assumption may be less obvious for highly paid managers. If one, therefore, assumes that absolute risk-aversion of a manager is constant, such that V TB > 0 is guaranteed (see (A.3.3') in Appendix 3), tax profit declarations unambiguously decline with the measure O of outside control. Therefore, more tightly controlled firms will be characterised by lower tax overpayments or more tax evasion. This suggests that economies with widely dispersed ownership of firms experience less tax evasion by firms and more extensive tax overpayments.
Moreover, given constant absolute risk-aversion, the fixed salary I of managers either reduces or has no impact on tax evasion but raises tax overpayments. Countries in which managers obtain high fixed salaries should, therefore, experience (weakly) less tax evasion than countries in which managers' income is lower, but greater tax overpayments. The positive impact of greater marginal costs of excessive book profit statements on evasion behaviour in the absence of risk effects, i.e. for constant absolute risk-aversion, is due to the manager's desire to counteract the fall in income caused by lower book profit declarations by a rise in the income from tax evasion.
Thus, raising the effectiveness of capital markets to verify information by firms increases tax evasion. The price for enforcing more honesty with respect to book profits is that tax honesty declines. Hence, the model predicts that countries characterised by low book profit statementsrelative to true profits -are experiencing more tax evasion, and vice versa. Finally, a higher tax rate t reduces excessive tax payments and has uncertain effects on evasion behaviour, as is well known.
Given these changes in book and tax profit declarations, the model does not yield an unambiguous relation between book-tax differences and the determinants of managers'
remuneration. This ambiguity is due to the fact that both tax and book profit statements adjust and that often they do not represent substitutes but tend to move in the same direction.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Case 1, B > N = T)
The optimal choice of book profit declarations B is determined by V B = 0 (cf. equation (2)).
Since V BB = a 2 (1 -O) 2 u''(y) -V'' < 0 for T P N, and dB/dx = -V Bx /V BB for x = a, O, T, V, N, I, t, comparative static effects are determined by the sign of V Bx .
is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-aversion and
The signs and restrictions implied by equations (A.1.1) to (A.1.5) establish Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Case 2, B P T > N)
The derivatives of V T for y = y e = y c are given by V TT = 1, V TV' = 0, and:
The effects of variations in exogenous variables x on book and tax profits are determined by: .2.6) and D = V BB V TT -(V BT ) 2 = -V''u''(y)(at) 2 > 0. Also using (A.1.1) to (A.1.5), this yields dB/da = dB/dI = 0 and:
The signs and restrictions implied by equations (A.2.7) to (A.2.13) establish Proposition 2. If absolute risk-aversion is not decreasing too strongly with income, V TB > 0 will hold.
Changes in the first-order condition (3) for the optimal choice of tax profit declarations T, given a positive amount of tax evasion (T < N), are given by V TT = 1, V TV' = 0 and by: Note that if V TB P 0, V Tt will be negative for S = 0. 
